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PREACHERS OF GOD AND MARTYRS 
OF THE NATION 
THE POLITICS OF MURDER 
IN OTTOMAN MACEDONIA 
IN THE EARLY 2 0 t h CENTURY 
Basil C. Gounaris* 
Terror was not an exceptional phenomenon either in Macedonia or in any 
other part of the 19th century Ottoman Empire. It was a practise exercised by 
everybody that felt strong enough to resist or to escape reprisals. Christian 
peasants and pastoralists fell easy prey to brigands, bashibazouks, and gen-
darmes or to the regular army itself whenever it was convenient to any of 
these predators. Warfare of every kind or the threat of warfare multiplied such 
occasions. Mobilised and armed men simply could not resist the temptation of 
plundering, looting and sacking their fellow Christian peasants. It was the clo-
sest battlefield to reach, the easiest victory to achieve, and the most remune-
rative campaign to fight. Many times such practices also involved murder, vio-
lation, or kidnapping for ransom. Yet there were no high politics behind this 
terror, at least until the Armenian massacres of 1896. It was a fact of life, a 
lengthy process related to the social and economic disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire. 
THE POLITICS OF TERROR 
There is no doubt that the politics of terror and indeed of murder were in-
troduced to Macedonia by the Bulgarian revolutionary committees in the late 
1890s1. Whatever their members - known in Turkish as the comitadjis - had 
' Department of History and Archaeology, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece. 
E-mail: vkg@hist.auth.gr. 
[g] means references are in greek. 
1
 Cf. Perry (Duncan), The Politics of Terror. The Macedonian Revolutionary Movements, 1893-1903, 
Durham : Duke University Press, 1988. 
32 / Balkanologie IX (1-2), décembre 2005, p. 31-43 
in mind about the future of Macedonia, certainly Greeks and Serbs were not 
part of it. This exclusive character might not be that clear in the many revi-
sions of their constitutions but it was quite evident in practice2. What all the 
committees and their fractions had in common was the silent backing of the 
Bulgarian Exarchic Church, a fact hardly ever mentioned in the IMRO3 litera-
ture. It was not a formal alliance and far for from being a peaceful co-exis-
tence. It was "unholy" in many ideological aspects but still a strategic neces-
sity. Joining the Exarchate and abandoning the Ecumenical Patriarchate was 
not simply a symbolic gesture for an individual or a community. According 
to the 10th article of the 1870 firman establishing the Bulgarian Exarchate, a 
majority of two thirds was a precondition for any bishopric to shift its alle-
giance to this new institution. In the 1890s, such shift was an important poli-
tical decision and the Committees knew it. It was the first step on the way to 
Sofia, or else, a clear sign of opposition to Constantinople, Athens, and 
Belgrade. Apparently and quite understandably, in the case of peasant com-
munities, especially in the disputed middle-zone of Macedonia, streching to 
the South of Ohrid, Kroushevo, Strumitsa and Melnik and to the North of 
Kastoria, Edessa (Voden), Yanitsa, and Serres, this step was more important 
and practical than the dubious digestion of socialism. This zone crossed no 
less than nine bishoprics, which had been claimed as Bulgarian in 1866 but 
had been left out the Exarchic jurisdiction in 1870 and of the Bulgarian 
Principality in 1878. 
Of course the committees did not plan to murder all those who opposed 
the Exarchate. It was not necessary. The General Regulations introduced by the 
Porte in the late 1860s in the context of the Tanzimat reform scheme had as-
sisted the secularisation of community administration and certainly the in-
troduction of some democratic principles. Bishops could no longer impose 
their will unchallenged. As a result of this innovation and for multiple other 
social and economic reasons opposition parties had grown at every 
Macedonian village. The absence of influential and indisputable notables -
especially in the chiflics - maximised domestic tension. All Committee leaders 
had to do was to manipulate this tension by recruiting a rising Greek or 
Bulgarian-educated elite, who did not wish to go back to the fields and become 
tenant farmers like their forefathers. Such men, on many occasions descen-
2
 For a brief account of all the material I have used, see Panayotopoulou (Anna), From Thessaloniki to 
Krousevo: Ideology, Organisation and Activities of IMRO, 1893-1903 [g], Aristotle University of Thessaloniki 
: unpublished MA thesis, 1993, where all the available Bulgarian sources are cited. 
3
 The Internal Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) was established in 
Thessaloniki in 1893. IMRO had had a troubled relationship with the other major Bulgarian Committee, 
the Supremists, founded (1895) and based in Sofia, varying from brotherly co-operation to open clash. 
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dants of priests, if given arms, would not hesitate to use calculated violence in 
order to win the majority and redirect the politics of their communities4. 
What "calculated violence" means is obvious from two British reports 
drawn in 1900 : the former lists all the murders committed since the year 1894 
by the Bulgarians on Orthodox-Greek inhabitants of the vilayet of 
Thessaloniki and the latter the murdered Serbs since 1897. In a total of 66 cases 
of assault, seventeen were against landed proprietors, mostly village notables, 
twelve against educational personnel, eleven against priests (16,6%) and four 
against merchants5. Obviously the selection of targets was not random. It is 
quite safe to guess that some Greek and Serbian priests and notables had re-
sisted Bulgarian penetration more vigorously than expected. Since teachers 
were socially involved with or related to notables and clergymen and their ap-
pointment was viewed as an indication of national loyalties, they were also 
classified as primary targets. 
The scale of violence in the early years of the twentieth century was un-
precedented. No less than 200 people were murdered between January 1901 
and August 1903. Then it got worse. Even if we exclude the victims of the 
Ilinden uprising (i.e. those killed between August and November 1903) as well 
as the members of the Greek and Bulgarian bands - to the extent that this is 
possible since many of them were locals - still the death list is extremely long. 
According to the British annual reports on political crime, no less than 3.300 
murders were committed in the following 56 months (an average of almost 60 
deaths per month) by Bulgarian, Greek, Romanian and Serbian activists as well 
as by state forces6. 600 more were assassinated in the period between the re-
volt of the Young Turks and the Balkan wars. 10 % of the victims were of un-
known national preference ; 53 % were classified as Bulgarians, 33,5 % as 
Greeks. Romanians and Serbs as a whole were no more than 3,5 %. In some 750 
cases, the occupation of the victim is known : Priests and notables represented 
roughly a 30 %. Considering their social status, it is not likely that there were 
many more of them among the 3 360 cases of unknown occupation. Therefore 
it could be argued that they represented a rough 5 % of all fatal assaults in a 
twelve-year period. Among these victims were some 100 priests of various 
ranks, 2/3 of them Greek-Orthodox. 
4
 See Gounaiis (Basil C), « Social Cleavages and National "Awakening" in Ottoman Macedonia », East 
European Quarterly, 29 {4), 1995 and Agelopoulos (Georgios), « Perceptions, Construction, and Definition 
of Greek National Identity in Late 19th - Early 20 th Century Macedonia », Balkan Studies, 36 (2), 1995. 
5
 Public Records Office, FO 195/2089, attached to Biliotti's report, (38), 20 April 1900, ff. 128-133. 
6
 This statistic is based on the electronic data-base of the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle in 
Thessaloniki. Its main sources are the British annual reports found at the Public Records Office, series 
FO195. 
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THE CLERICAL TARGETS 
Apparently the escalation of violence had reduced the percentage of se-
lected clerical targets over the total death toll from 16,6 to some 2,5 %. The per-
centage of clergymen registered in the official Greek list of veterans of the 1903-
1908 struggle is of the same scale. Still it looks to me relatively high, considering 
that priests, monks, and other Church officials could not have represented more 
than the actual 1 % of the Christian population. However, the questions asked in 
this paper go beyond the quantification of the losses that clergy suffered in 
Macedonia. They seek to explain in particular, more than their violent death, 
the involvement of village vicars and priests in the Greek-Bulgarian national 
struggle in terms of community politics and irregular warfare. 
Priests in Macedonian villages were not different from their flock. They 
were peasants and lived like peasants. More often than not, priesthood was he-
reditary. It secured an extra-income of unknown size, a position of some au-
thority amongst the village notables, and the role of the go-in-between their 
community and the local bishop. Such relation would be a useful asset for the 
ordination of a son or a nephew when the old priest died. The appointment of 
a member of his family as the village teacher was also a possible favour. As a 
rule preachers were not illiterate but of course there were many exceptions : 
men of refined knowledge who widely travelled like Papa-Stavro Tsami, the 
vicar of the Vlach-speaking village of Pisoderi or completely ignorant like so 
many priests in the miserable malaria stricken chiflicks of the plains. 
Occasionally priests served also as community teachers but in the early twen-
tieth century this practise was rather exceptional since there was no shortage 
of academy graduates, sponsored by various nationalist societies and indeed 
by the Balkan Foreign Ministry budgets7. 
The infiltration of the Exarchate into the Southern parts of Macedonia 
multiplied the positions of Church officials of every kind. According to an esti-
mate in 1891 in the region of Kastoria, only 13 out of 53 villages had abandoned 
the Patriarchate and in the region of Bitola 24 out of 100. In 1896, the figures 
had risen to 26 and 42 respectively8. Exarchic communities, according to their 
size and power, demanded rotating services, built their own churches, occu-
pied one of the existing or even the main village church, if they could. If they 
were outnumbered, they simply restricted themselves to the small churches of 
the graveyards. In any case, new priests were ordained unless the serving 
7
 Cf. Vouri (Sofia), Education and Nationalism in the Balkans. The Case of NW Macedonia 1870-1904 [g], 
Athens: Paraskinino, 1992. 
8
 FO195/1849, « Shipley to Blunt, Monastir, 31 March.1894 », ff. 103-107 and « Blunt to Currie, Thessalonlki, 
20 April 1894 », f. 86. 
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- running the risk of getting out of business or getting killed - opted for the 
Exarchate. If no compromise could be reached, then the Ottoman authorities 
had the power to seal the disputed church9. Needless to say this was not a de-
cision easy to reach because the Exarchic Church since 1872 was an unholy 
schismatic institution anathematised by the Patriarch. Moreover the introduc-
tion of relative democratic principals in the administration of the community 
did not necessarily imply a free vote. Some families, especially large zadrugas, 
landed proprietors, shop-keepers, retailers, those who paid most of the taxes, 
hired labourers, sponsored the school, and knew the Ottoman administration 
could exercise influence disproportional to their actual number. They were the 
local patrons. Had it not been for the presence of armed bands probably they 
would have dominated rural areas and have made it much more difficult for 
the Exarchate to prevail. But guns changed the situation utterly. Nationalism 
and revolutionary ideas created a new relentless elite of high-school graduates 
and ambitious migrants ready to take over administration at all cost. Just a 
handful of them could put an official claim on any church and eventually 
achieve, if not rotation, then interruption of services by Turkish intervention10. 
Priests were caught in between and neutrality was not an option. If the 
decision was for the Exarchate, then they were expected to sign the relevant 
petition to the authorities and to start praising the Exarch instead of the 
Patriarch in all services. Obviously they could not stay idle ; in fact, their ener-
getic support was considered indispensable either way. Such decisions were 
not easily taken, especially if a community could not reach it on its own will. 
In that case, the procedure was almost standard. A Bulgarian band would enter 
the village at night, pay a visit to the priest, summon the villagers in the 
church, and initiate them to their new "national faith". It would then ask the 
priest, the mayor, and the council members to sign their declaration and the 
seal keeper (muchtar) to stamp it. If they had time they would also ask all the 
priests together to perform the Exarchic service in order to commit them fully 
to the new cause and expose them in public11. There was no middle-way. Papa-
Tale, reverend and teacher of Greek at the village Sirbsi, was killed on the spot 
when he refused to put up the band of voevoda Sougaref in March 190312. In 
the village of Sklithro (Zelenits), even a priest from Peloponnisos (Southern 
9
 For a rather detailed account of such events see the study by Dakin (Douglas), The Greek Struggle in 
Macedonia 1897-1913, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966. 
10
 Alexandra (Alexis), ed., The Archive of National Martyr Bishop of Smyrna Chrysostomos [g], Athens : 
MIET, 2000, vol.1 (Drama 1902-1910), pp. 20-22. 
11
 Karavangelis (Germanos),« The Struggle for Macedonia. Memoirs », in The Penelope Delta Archive of the 
Struggle for Macedonia. Memoirs [g], Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1984, p. 11; Dragoumis (Ion), The Note-Books of 
Ilinden [g], Athens : Ekdoseis Petsivas, 2000, p. 62. Several petitions of this kind can be found in Bulgarian 
Academy of Sciences, ed., Macedonia. Documents and Material, Sofia, 1978, document n°111, pp. 571-589. 
12
 Diagoumis (Ion), op.cit., p. 66. 
36 /Balkanologie IX (1-2), décembre 2005, p. 31-43 
Greece) had been "convinced" to join the Bulgarian Church13. When Greek 
bands appeared on the scene, shortly before Ilinden, they followed the very 
same practise, sometimes in the encouraging presence of bishop of Kastoria, 
Germanos Karavangelis, a young Greek clergyman famous for his nationalist 
fervour and the tough handling of his enemies14. Any Patriarchist bishop, whe-
never the Greeks regained control of a village, could dismiss the Exarchic 
priest, if he had been ordained by a schismatic bishop15. 
Even at the gunpoint joining the schismatic Church was not an easy deci-
sion for people notorious for their attachment to tradition. Yet in dogmatic 
terms and worship practices peasants could hardly say the difference. The 
overwhelming majority of them could not even understand the services at all, 
either in Church Slavonic or in Hellenistic Greek. Neither their piety was at risk 
nor were their religious practises, especially if the old and the new priest were 
the same individual. In terms of politics, however, the difference was para-
mount since after the declaration had been signed the village was expected to 
accommodate Greek or Bulgarian bands, prepare a local militia and special 
hides for gun, men, and ammunition, furnish reliable messengers and reserve 
food. In return most members of the "national committee" would receive fi-
nancial support or even monthly salaries as high as one Turkish pound16. 
Village priests were expected to be not simply a part of this network but at the 
very hard core of it. 
Some were indeed hard-core nationalists and this was not a matter of 
threat or reward. It had to do with their stubborn character, sound national 
education, family history, and the backing they had secured from their allies 
inside the community and the bands in the vicinity. Papa Stavros Tsamis was 
a regular informer of the Greek Consulate in Bitola and a valuable liaison for 
the Greek bands. This is why he was murdered with an axe in August 190617. 
His colleague, the priest of Variko (Mocren), a "staunch Bulgarian", had a nar-
row escape when he was ambushed in February 1905 on his return from 
Kastoria by a band led by an ex voevoda from Vasiliada (Zagoritsani), who had 
joined the Greek side18. 
There is evidence that priests had even killed with their own hands their 
predecessors or their competitors. This was the case of the Exarchic priest pop-
13
 Karavangelis (Germanos), op.cit., p. 27. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Chrysostomos (Kalafatis), op.cit. p. 21. 
16
 Tsondos-Vardas (Georgios), The Struggle for Macedonia [g], Athens : Ekdoseis Petsivas, 2003, vol. 1 
(Diary 1904-1905), p. 30. 
17
 For an uneven view of Papa-Stavros by its enemies see Sonnichsen (Albert), Confessions of a 
Macedonian Bandit, New York : Duffield, 1909, chapter XXII. 
18
 Tsondos-Vardas (Georgios), op.cit., pp. 87-88. 
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Nikola in the village of Perikopi (Prekopana) on Mt Vitsi, who killed his prede-
cessor, papa-Christo, in July 1903. It was also the case of Papa-Elia, the aged 
Greek-Orthodox priest of Velousina. Papa-Elia had a small parish of only se-
venteen houses, the rest of his village being Exarchic. He would toll the bell, 
gun in hand, and assemble his flock one by one. With the same gun he woun-
ded seriously his Exarchic colleague but the latter, quite unexpectedly, recove-
red. Papa-Elia knew that revenge was soon to come, so he invited repeatedly 
Greek bands to give a pre-emptive strike to his opponents in the village of 
Optitsar in the outskirts of Bitola. He failed to convince the band of Karavitis 
in July 1905 but he succeeded to attract the daring band of Makris in the spring 
of 190619. He led the band himself to Optitsar but started to shake when they 
approached the enemy village. When he refused to proceed he was lifted and 
carried by the fighters and left just outside the village. The band entered the 
village, arrested eight men, and brought them to the priest to identify them. 
Papa-Elias still shaking refused even to see them. He closed his eyes, covered 
his face, and begged not to be presented. Makris assured him that he was run-
ning no risk for his life for these Bulgarians where not going to see anyone 
else, at least not in this world20. 
Indeed murders were unlikely to happen if retaliation was to follow soon. 
This is why the band of Pavlos Melas rushed to kill the murderer priest of 
Perikopi21. In the village of Mesimeri, when the Graecoman (i.e. fanatic Greek) 
priest Papa-Stoyan was murdered by a Bulgarian band in February 1905, the 
villagers themselves pressed Akritas22, a Greek bandleader, to revenge his 
death or they would leave the Patriarchate. They convinced him in May 1905 to 
murder an Exarchic priest, Pop-Gotse Stoichef, who had shifted sides for 
money, on his Sunday visit to the local monastery23. As a rule in Macedonia no 
side could secure a region to the extent that was necessary to deter enemy ini-
tiatives. Therefore in most cases such murders were likely to initiate a new cir-
cle of retaliation. In 1901, when the Bulgarians murdered the seventy-year-old 
19
 Karavitis (Ioannis), The Struggle for Macedonia. Memoirs [g], Athens : Ekdoseis Petsivas, 1994, vol.1, 
pp. 344-345-
20
 Makris (Georgios-Dikonymos), « The Struggle for Macedonia. Memoirs », in The Penelope Delta 
Archive of the Struggle for Macedonia. Memoirs (op.cit.), pp. 151-152. 
21
 Mela (Natalia), ed., Pavlos Melas [g], Athens : Dodoni, 1964, p. 390. Melas was the first Greek officer 
killed in action in Macedonia. He was the perfect apostle of Hellenism in Macedonia but his performance 
as a chieftain was rather poor. His father-in-law was Stephanos Dragoumis, ex-Foreign Minister and his 
brother-in-law was Ion Dragounis, Secretary at the Greek Consulate in Bitola, both strongly involved in 
the Macedonian affairs. 
22
 Second-Lieutenant Konstandinos Mazarakis-Ainian had already served as military attache at the 
Greek Consulate General in Thessaloniki. 
23
 Mazarakis-Ainian (K.), « The Struggle for Macedonia. Recollections », in The Struggle for Macedonia. 
Memoirs [g], Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1984, pp. 249-250. 
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papa-Dimitri of Asprogeia (Strebeno), bishop Karavangelis ordained his 
twenty year old son and encouraged his nephew Vangelis, a man of impressive 
statue, to revenge his uncle's murder24. In another case, when papa-
Konstandinos of Polypotamos (Nered) was murdered in 1902, his son was or-
dained in his place and was renamed Konstandinos. It was not long before the 
young priest became the new target of IMRO. Few weeks before Ilinden, he 
evacuated his family to Fiorina and himself left for Athens carrying a refe-
rence letter from Ion Dragoumis, secretary of the Greek Consulate in Bitola25. 
He was soon to return to his post and become involved. In October 1904, he in-
formed Melas and his men that three bands of comitadjis were sheltered in his 
village and led the Greeks to their hide26. The new priest of Kratero (Rakovo), 
"a clean-cut young man" was also the son of the late priest killed by the 
Bulgarians. Therefore he did not hesitate to present himself on his own will 
and offer his services to the band of Vardas (nom-de-guerre of Lieutenant 
Georgios Tsondos), who had succeeded Melas in the leadership of Greek bands 
in Western Macedonia2?. 
Not all of the priests were prepared to stand up and die for a cause. When 
the band of Kaoudis, a tough Cretan, met the priest of Triandafylia (Lazen) in 
late August 1904, the latter started to pray. He narrated the misfortunes of his 
village, and eventually he confessed to the chieftain : « Even myself, I pretend 
to be a Bulgarian. During the service loudly I honour the Exarch but whispe-
ring in my prayers I praise the Patriarch. Only God knows what's in my soul »28. 
He then became a regular informer of the Greek side. In fact, his case looks 
more representative of the average priest attitude, for the simple reason that it 
was flexible and less risky. On another occasion, when the band of Korakas en-
tered Nestorio (Nestram) in the region of Kastoria, the chieftain asked the 
priest who headed the welcome committee : « Are you Greek or Bulgarian ? 
You joined the Exarchate under pressure, you even accepted a Bulgarian tea-
cher. (...) Tomorrow they will go for your houses, wives, and children ? Why didn't 
you take guns in hand ? Aren't you Christians ? Aren't you Greeks ? ». The 
priest responded with caution: « Master, how dare you break our hurts by cal-
ling us Bulgarians ? Now that you are here we shall go together to the monas-
tery and "Christianise", and we shall even take guns, if we need to. (...) 
Meanwhile please leave the village, for if Mitro the Vlach - notorious for his 
24
 Karavangelis (Germanos) art.cit, p. 21. 
25
 Dragoumis (Ion), op.cit, p. 171. Ion Dragoumis, of Macedonian origin himself, was a pioneer of the 
Greek organisation in NW Macedonia. 
26
 Karavitis (Ioannis), op.cit., pp. 110-111. 
27
 Tsondos-Vardas (Georgios), op.cit, vol.2/1 (Diary 1906), p. 234. 
28
 Gounaris (Vasilis K.), ed., The Autumn of 1904 in Macedonia. The Unpublished Diary of Euthymios 
Kaoudis [g], Thessaloniki: Mouseio Makedonikou Agona, 1992, p. 30. 
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cruelty - is informed for your presence here, we are doomed to death »29. 
Korakas left but other chieftains were less tactful with priests. The ruthless 
papa-Drakos, an armed priest born in Eastern Romelia and a true giant in size, 
a follower of Makris, used to shake and curse any timid priest they met in 
Macedonia and ask them loudly: « What kind of priest are you ? Why on earth 
do we keep you up here ? ». The threat was too open to neglect30. 
As a rule Greek chieftains of every kind were fully aware of the precarious 
situation in Macedonian villages. Torture and death was a penalty that IMRO 
would not hesitate to implement upon Graecoman activist priests, especially if 
they were stigmatised as turncoat adventurers. They have seen that happen 
many times. So threat had to be calculated and flavoured with some praise 
and, most of all, with encouragement. Vardas, found suitable the occasion of a 
common service at the Monastery of Dragos, few days before Christmas 1906, 
to deliver an enthusiastic speech to an assembly of seven priests31. Another 
time, having criticised severely the reverend of Touholi for his undue fear, he 
advised him to go to open-market of Nestorio, wonder around, and show to 
everybody that "times had changed" and he was no longer afraid of the 
Bulgarians32. From the voluminous diaries of Vardas it becomes clear that to-
lerance and encouragement secured profitable co-operation with numerous 
Patriarchist priests who were used extensively as organisers, agents of every 
kind, messengers, informers, hosts of bands. Their effectiveness or incompe-
tence was not necessarily related to their loyalty or dishonesty but their most 
important contribution, after all, was simply retaining their posts. And this 
was not guaranteed. If they were terrified, they were bound to leave and settle 
in Kastoria, Fiorina or any other major town, like so many Patriarchist priests 
had done in 190333. The aforementioned papa-Dimitri of Asprogeia, ordained 
by Karavangelis in the place of his murdered father, fled to the nearby town of 
Lehovo when the Bulgarians burnt his house and controlled his village in early 
190534. Priesthood was welcomed as a hereditary right but martyrdom was too 
heavy a burden to carry. Vardas knew well that even Vlach-speaking Papa-
Stavros, a national hero par-excellence and eventually a martyr, could neither 
break-up his relations with his pro-Romanian acquaintances and relatives nor 
abstain from any service they participated35. Yet he was valuable. 
29
 Stavropoulos (Vasileios), « The Struggle for Macedonia. Memoirs », The Struggle for Macedonia. 
Memoirs (op.cit), pp. 402-403. 
30
 Makris (Georgios-Dikonymos), art.cit, p. 91; cf. Tsondos-Vaidas (Georgios), op.cit., vol. 1, p. 53. 
31
 Tsondos-Vardas (Georgios), op.cit., vol.1, pp . 365-367. 
32
 Ibid., p . 200. 
33
 Cf. Dragoumis (Ion), op.cit., pp . 24, 542. 
34
 Tsondos-Vardas (Georgios), op.cit., vol.1, p . 95. 
35
 Tsondos-Vardas (Georgios), op.cit., vol.2/1, p . 54. 
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Valuable and energetic priests who were prepared to risk their lives ac-
quired special privileges as members of the new local national elite or com-
mittees. This was a fact for both camps. Some became treasurers and used 
state money to finance their next of keen instead of the village network36. 
Others tried to exploit their national contribution to settle personal or profes-
sional disputes in their favour37. There is also strong evidence that a few 
priests used their close links with the bands to blackmail their local oppo-
nents, regardless of their religious affiliation. They threatened and in many 
cases they managed to accuse them as national enemies in order to achieve 
their murder by bandsmen, without risking revenge themselves38. Given the 
fluidity of loyalties and the perplex network of relations it was not particularly 
difficult to expose anyone. Indeed it seems there was no standard way to no-
minate priests or other individuals as imminent targets. Bandleaders had to 
relay on pouring information from other priests, the local bishop, and various 
national committees. They had to check thoroughly any accusation before is-
suing orders for murder but this, due to serious difficulties in communication, 
was not always easy. The case of papa-Vasili of Flambouro (Negovani) is typi-
cal. Accusations that he was a traitor were pilling up but Vardas kept on won-
dering whether all this evidence was circumstantial39. 
In some cases there was no hesitation. Papa-Yanni of Agiochori (Gratsan) 
near Drama had been “adviced” repeatedly to review his loyalty to the 
Patriarche and let his village join the Bulgarian side. Since he ignored all war-
nings, he was stubbed to death a summer night of 190640. Papa-Tirpo of 
Ieropigi (Kostenets) toped the list of Vardas targets. The Greeks knew that he 
had been the official representative of the Exarchate in Kastoria, a close friend 
of the notorious voevoda Vasil Tsakalarof and the protagonist in his village de-
cision to join the Bulgarian cause41. He had to die. Papa-Stamatis Tanchef was 
the black-beard impressive vicar of the Exarchic Church in Thessaloniki, the 
"biting heart" of the Bulgarian movement. Everybody suspected that he was a 
Bulgarian officer in clandestine operation42. He was a difficult target, however, 
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since he was always under armed escort. Alexandros from Aivali, the least 
suspected executioner, accomplished the deadly mission. He was a young man 
of French education and socialist orientation who simply could not resist the 
glory of priest killing43. Makris, a Cretan, in his memoirs recalled with pride 
the night he set an ambush at Lissolai and killed thirteen Bulgarians, among 
them two priests, two teachers and one voevoda44. On another occasion a pro-
minent member of the Greek committee threatened to resign because the as-
sassination of the Bulgarian priest of Emporio had not been assigned to his 
own trusted executioners. The local chieftain replied that there were plenty of 
heroic deeds to be accomplished but it looks that no venture could match the 
glory of killing activist priests45. It was a stock that was not easily replaceable. 
When the pro-Serbian priest of Virbiani at the kaza or Prilep was murdered in 
February 1903, the General Consul of Serbia went himself to the village to in-
vestigate the incident46. Serbian clergy was in short supply in Macedonia. 
As far as Greeks were concerned, village priests were the second of the two 
pillars indispensable for irregular warfare and national indoctrination. The se-
cond was the network of monasteries all around Macedonia. No less than 25 of 
them were located in Western Macedonia, some on the natural routes that bands 
followed to intrude Turkish territory. It was a Patriarchist domain where the 
Exarchate had slim chances to recruit followers ; the Bulgarian monastery at Mt 
Athos being the only exception in the littoral part of Macedonia. Monasteries in 
the highlands were the best-stocked and comfortable hides. Since the life of 
women and children was not endangered, bands would not hesitate to ask shel-
ter in their premises as many times as they had to. It is hard to decide whether 
bandsmen were welcome indeed. There is plenty of evidence that some abbots, 
even at the Greek side of the border, were reluctant to take side or to jeopardise 
the welfare of the monastery. They had been exhausted by the frequent visits of 
brigands and they wanted to be left in peace. It took them some time to adjust 
themselves to the fact that these new brigands were fighting for a cause. In most 
cases, however, Greek bands were hosted with generosity and fervent enthu-
siasm and this is testified by the frequent and fierce Bulgarian attacks that mo-
nasteries suffered. Some incidents are better known than others: in March 1905, 
were destroyed the monasteries of Sliven and Tsirilovo ; in August 1905, the 
Monastery of Lissolai; in January 1906, the Monastery of the Holy Trinity near 
Pisoderi; in March 1907, the Monastery of Ossani. They were all strategic targets 
of considerable importance, which had to be neutralised. 
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CONCLUSION 
The politics of terror in Macedonia is a story more complicated than it 
looks at first sight. The death of activists was eventually useful to all sides. 
Assassins rejoiced and boasted for the death of their worst enemies. The camp 
which had suffered losses tried to profit the most out of its misfortunes by ta-
king pictures of the tortured bodies and compiling lists of martyrs to be for-
warded to consular offices and newspaper agents everywhere in the world. 
Then it started to organise revenge of an equal scale. At a lower level, however, 
it was a civil war between fellow villagers, whose petty-politics and social 
cleavages of every kind had been indissolubly mingled with the high politics 
of the Macedonian Question. 
In any case, this first round, before 1912, was a war for souls rather than 
territories, as it has been repeated many times, therefore priests could not ab-
stain47. On this, there was consent. Arguing for the Exarchate or, to be precise, 
against the least popular of the local bishops, was easier than preaching na-
tionalism or socialism to peasants. It was also convenient to all the Bulgarian 
Committees. Detachment from the Patriarchate was imperative regardless of 
the final solution of the Macedonian Question. It was a good start for them. On 
the other camp, the appointment of young, educated and energetic bishops 
like Germanos Karavangelis in Kastoria, Ioakeim Foropoulos in Bitola, and 
Chrysostomos Kalafatis in Drama, all in the early 1900s, testifies that the 
Patriarchate had eventually decided to side with the forces of Greek nationa-
lism in order to safeguard its valuable Macedonian bishoprics. Therefore its 
crew, village priests, was mobilised, although in theory the Patriarchate was 
against the ecclesiastical segregation of "races"48. 
The list of the deceased is far from complete but the fact still remains that 
assassinated Greek-Orthodox priests and notables (especially seal-keepers) 
outnumbered their Exarchist counterparts roughly by two to one. This reflects 
the offensive character of the Bulgarian committees and the early start they 
have had. Until late 1904, hardly any Exarchist priest had been killed compared 
to twenty Patriarchists. In 1907, casualties were equal. It also proves that, in 
terms of figures and impression, the Greek bands cancelled half of what 
Bulgarians achieved in the southern parts of Macedonia. The total death toll 
that clergy suffered in almost ten years of struggle clearly proves that conque-
ring the souls of priests by force was not an easy matter. Despite the para-
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mount symbolic importance of the actual assassination, indeed it was coun-
terproductive. The extensive use of violence exercised by the Committees to 
the equal benefit of the Bulgarian Exarchate proved detrimental for both of 
them. In the era of romantic nationalism the army of Patriarchist dead priests, 
true martyrs of the nation, was invincible. 
